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BOOK REVIEWS
Federal Jurisdiction: A General View. By Henry J. Friendly.
Columbia University Press; 1973. Pp. 199. $10.00.
Judge Friendly's book, like his judicial opinions, is lucid,
scholarly and pragmatic. It contains his suggestions to Congress
and the courts as to how the present jurisdiction of the federal
courts ought to be modified. Because of Judge Friendly's stature
and the wide-spread and well-justified respect in which he is held,
this is likely to be an influential book, at least in the academic
community and perhaps with Congress and the courts.
There is much in the book that is right and sensible: Judge
Friendly's opposition to a National Court of Appeals to control
the docket of the Supreme Court and to provide another level of
review between the Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court;' his
desire to see FELA litigation replaced by national workmen's
compensation legislation2 and motor vehicle accident cases excluded from the federal courts;3 his call for the abolition of a
jurisdictional amount requirement in general federal question
cases;4 and his zeal for a rationalization and simplification in the
choice of forums now available to a taxpayer seeking to litigate
his tax liability."
But in other, perhaps more important, areas Judge Friendly
is either wrong or on much weaker ground than he acknowledges.
There are at least four major concerns of great importance to the
conduct of business in the federal courts that fall into this category: The idea that the answer to the recent and dramatic increase in the caseload of federal courts is to reduce the scope of
federal jurisdiction instead of increasing the number of judges;
Judge Friendly's admittedly "Faustian conflict" growing out of
a desire to give state courts a fair chance to vindicate federal
constitutional rights, on the one hand, and a recognition of the
appropriateness of federal courts having primary responsibility
for such matter, on the other; Judge Friendly's one-sided condemnation of certain class actions; and his recommendation for
the abolition of diversity jurisdiction.
1. H. FRIENDLY,
cited as FRIENDLY].
2. Id. at 129-31.
3. Id. at 133-37.
4. Id. at 123-24.
5. Id. at 161-71.
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FEWER CASES OR MORE JUDGES?

One solution to the dramatic increase in the caseload of the
federal courts in recent years' is to add more judges. For reasons
I find most unpersuasive, Judge Friendly rejects this possibility:
[A]s it seems to me, there must come a point when an
increase in the number of judges makes judging, even at the
trial level, less prestigious and less attractive. Prestige is a
very important factor in attracting highly qualified men to
the federal bench from much more lucrative pursuits. Yet
the largest district courts will be in the very metropolitan
areas where the discrepancy between uniform federal salaries and the financial rewards of private practice is the greatest, and the difficulty of maintaining an accustomed standard of living on the federal salary the most acute. There is
real danger that in such areas, once the prestige factor was
removed, lawyers with successful practices, particularly
young men, would not be willing to make the sacrifice.'
Judge Friendly is undoubtedly correct that, if federal judges were
as numerous as the judges of traffic courts or small claims courts,
the federal positions would have little prestige and correspondingly little attraction. The question is whether, in the major metropolitan areas, we are approaching that point. My strong impression is that we are not.
Thus, when Senator Percy of Illinois recently solicited
suggestions for possible judicial nominees to fill a vacancy in the
district court for the Northern District of Illinois, one local bar
association was able to provide over twenty names, most of whom
were excellent lawyers with the ability needed to serve as a federal judge. I would be surprised if the same were not true in other
6. HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 51 (2d ed.
1973), lists the following statistics that tell much of the story:
1970
1960
Private Civil cases:
Federal Question (including admiralty)
34,846
13,175
Diversity
22,854
17,048
United States Civil cases:
U.S. plaintiff
U.S. defendant
Criminal cases
Bankruptcy cases

13,310
11,655

14,986
5,854

39,959
194,399

29,828
110,034

109

Total
7.

FRIENDLY at

29-30 (footnote omitted).

317,023

190,925
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areas. (The more general problem may be to find senators who
have the same willingness as Senator Percy to attempt to identify
the best qualified candidates for appointment.)
A second part of Judge Friendly's objection to increasing the
number of federal judges is that any major increase in the number
of district judges "would prove utterly destructive to the courts
of appeals and to the Supreme Court."8 Judge Friendly's own
statistics cast doubt upon this conclusion: With an increase of
273% in the workload of the courts of appeal between 1960 and
19721 there is no indication that those courts or the Supreme
Court have been seriously impaired in their functioning. Perhaps
one desirable consequence of the large increase is that procedures
to identify and dispose of clearly nonmeritorious appeals have
been developed. The Ninth Circuit has adopted such a rule and
the Seventh Circuit has a rule permitting it to dispose of certain
appeals without argument and on the basis of an order submitted
by the party seeking affirmance. I" It is probably too early to measure the real merit of such approaches, but they deserve to be
tried.
While one would hope that the federal courts will not continue indefinitely to grow and one must acknowledge that there
are major areas in which federal court activity should be contracted, Judge Friendly's dire warnings of the consequences of
some additional increase in judgeships seem overdone.
FEDERAL VERSUS STATE COURT ADJUDICATIONS

Few areas of federal jurisdiction are as technical and at the
same time as potentially important in federal-state relations as
the doctrines of abstention, exhaustion of state remedies before
federal litigation, and comity (the latter encompassing both a
court-created and a statutory ban, in certain circumstances, on
federal court injunctions of state court proceedings). Judge
Friendly's analysis of these three doctrines is set against his concern over the effects of the recent decisions in Lynch v. Household
Finance Corp." and Mitchum v. Foster. In Lynch, the Supreme
8. Id. at 31.
9. Id. at 31-32.
10. 9TH CIR. R. 3(a) ("Oral argument would not be of assistance to the court."); 7TH
CIR. R. 22 ("Questions presented by appellant's brief are insubstantial .... ").
The Fourth Circuit has adopted a similar rule: "If all the judges of the panel to which
a pending appeal has been referred conclude that the appeal is wholly without merit, the
appeal will be dismissed, or the judgment affirmed." 4TH CIR. R. 7(b).
11. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
12. 407 U.S. 225 (1972). See FRIENDLY at 90-100.
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Court held that section 1983 of the civil rights statute extended
to cases involving property rights as well as personal liberties.
Mitchum answered a long-standing question by holding that the
Civil Rights Act is an exception to the statute prohibiting federal
court injunctions of state court proceedings.'" "What makes this
decision especially devastating to proper federal-state relations",
Judge Friendly says, "is its combination with the [Lynch] decision a few months earlier which abandoned any attempts to limit
the Civil Rights Act to what the Reconstruction Congress had in
mind."' 4 It is against this background that he looks at the abstention, exhaustion and comity doctrines as "means for lessening
federal-state tensions ....
"I'
Abstention
One means for eliminating those tensions is to permit the
state court, for whose resolution of uncertain state law questions
a federal court has stayed its hand, to resolve both the state and
federal questions involved. Judge Friendly supports the part of
the American Law Institute proposal urging and requiring such
a procedure.'" The effect of such a rule, however, is to reject the
policy behind the Supreme Court's holding in England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners:
There are fundamental objections to any conclusion that a
litigant who has properly invoked the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court to consider federal constitutional claims
can be compelled, without his consent and through no fault
of his own, to accept instead a state court's determination of
those claims. 7
13. The statute is 29 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), which forbids a federal court to "grant,
an injunct ion to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act
of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments.- Mitchom holds that the Civil Rights Act falls into the exception for injunctions "expressly authorized by Act of Congress ....
"
As indicated by the Court in Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 243, principles of comity enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (not a § 2283 case), may still prevent the
issuance by a federal court of an injunction against pending state proceedings.
14.

FRIENDLY at 99.

15.

Id. at 92.

16.

Id. at 94 n.84; ALI, STUDY OF THE DiviSION OF JURISDICrION BETWEEN STATE AND

FEDERAL COURTS, § 1371(c), (d) (1969) (mandating other pre-conditions for abstention).
Judge Friendly does not approve of a codification of the pre-conditions for abstention.
FRIENDLY at 94.
17. 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964) (allowing preservation of the federal claim for the
federal forum).
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Absent some indication that the "shuttling back and forth" between state and federal courts that results from England's approach to abstention is a serious problem, there seems little basis
for overturning the strongly expressed opinion that abstention
should not act to divest federal trial courts of the opportunity to
decide questions of federal law. That portion of the ALI proposal
permitting federal courts to certify uncertain questions of law to
state courts should also help alleviate such practical problems as
arise. "I
While noting the bifurcation of issues that results from
England, Judge Friendly apparently would give little or no weight
to the policy, reflected in that decision, of favoring federal court
decision of federal issues. Instead, he emphasizes abstention's
equitable nature and draws principally upon Justice Frankfurter's decision in Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co. 9 However, Judge Friendly suggests giving the doctrine a shape of its
own that goes well beyond the Pullman doctrine. He would guide
the exercise of the equitable discretion to abstain by "the
strength of the federal interest involved . . . [and] the degree to
which abstention might avoid continuous federal supervision of
state functioning .. .. *"0 He would also abstain when the "particular grievance sparking the suit has been settled but 'public
service' lawyers wish to make a 'federal case' by bringing a class
action for declaratory or injunctive relief."'" Judge Friendly apparently had some doubts about abstention since in discussing it
later he acknowledges that "[t]he circumstances in which such
action is appropriate are narrow and should not be expanded into
'22
a general rule.
Central to Justice Frankfurter's concern in Pullman was the
possibility that if the federal court does not abstain an "unnecessary ruling of a federal court" must be made that may be "supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court" on a state law
aspect of the case; failure to abstain may result in "the friction
of a premature constitutional adjudication. '2 The state court
should decide the state law question because the federal policy
seeks to avoid unnecessary federal constitutional decisions and
18. ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
§ 1371(e) (1969). See D.P. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 508-10 (1968).
19. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
20. FRIENDLY at 95.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 103.
23. 312 U.S. at 500.

AND FEDERAL COURTS,
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because the state court alone can decide state law questions with
finality. Once the state law question is decided, however, there
is no longer "the friction of premature constitutional adjudication." Justice Frankfurter viewed abstention as a matter of timing-not as a matter of avoiding friction once the state law ques2
tion was settled. '
Judge Friendly's suggestion would make abstention a doctrine whose purpose is to avoid friction when, in his view, the
federal interest relied upon as the basis for jurisdiction is not
strong or the effect of granting a remedy may be protracted federal involvement in state affairs. That approach goes substantially beyond the purpose of abstention as stated by Justice
Frankfurter and is directly contrary to the position taken by the
Court in England."'
Exhaustion
Judge Friendly suggests that "Congress should provide that
a federal court faced with a challenge to the constitutionality of
state action, whether under the Civil Rights Act or otherwise,
may abstain pending exhaustion of state administrative remedies
and shall do so whenever these remedies are plain, adequate and
effective." 2
I would not go quite so far in encouraging federal courts to
postpone consideration of federal claims, although Judge
Friendly is certainly right to make application of the exhaustion
rule depend upon the kinds of state administrative remedies
available. The issues presented are very similar to those in the
abstention area: Can a needless decision of a federal issue be
avoided by recourse to a state procedure? If the answer is in the
affirmative, the abstention principles articulated in Pullman
24. See Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court in Louisiana Power & Light Co.
v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959) (emphasis added): "This course [abstention]
does not constitute abnegation of judicial duty. On the contrary, it is a wise and productive discharge of it. There is only postponement of decision for its best fruition."
25. This is not to say that abstention is only appropriate when state law is unsettled
and its decision may narrow or eliminate federal issues, although Justice Frankfurter
seemed to view it thus. Both Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341
(1951), and Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), suggest a broader doctrine. See
the discussion in HART AND WECH4SLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 99496 (2d ed. 1973). But those cases, while supportive of abstention without uncertainty in
state law, arose in the context of complex state regulatory schemes for oil and gas
regulation and a special state interest in regulating the discontinuance of rail service.
Neither would go so far as Judge Friendly's approach and, as Justice Frankfurter's dissents indicated, both decisions were probably wrong.
26.
FRIENDLY at 101.
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warrant staying the federal court proceeding. Such a result does
not, however, require a statutory change. Moreover, the requirement of a mandatory stay whenever state remedies are "plain,
adequate and effective" would engraft, onto all federal-claims
litigation, the limitation that Congress has enacted only for federal court actions seeking injunctions against the collection of
state taxes and rate orders.17 The result is to create a necessarily
substantial federal inquiry into the adequacy of state remedies in
every case, a process that may waste federal judicial resources
rather than conserve them and most likely will engender unwarranted delays in final adjudication of what may be simple federal
questions 2
Comity
Judge Friendly notes that this doctrine is two headed: There
are separate court-created and statutory doctrines dealing with
federal court injunctions of state court proceedings. 9 He laments
the Supreme Court's holding, in the 1971 Term, that the CivilRights Act is an exception to the statutory ban on such injunctions,' and he lauds Younger v. Harris3 ' and companion cases for
applying the court-created doctrine. 2 Although in Younger and
in the cases decided with it the Court was careful to distinguish
between injunctions against pending state proceedings (which are
generally not permitted absent special circumstances or irreparable injury) and declaratory judgment actions when no state proceeding is pending (which appear, generally, to be authorized),
Judge Friendly states:
There would . . . be merit in a statute which provided that,
whether state proceedings be pending or impending, a federal court shall not issue an injunction or a declaratory judgment against the enforcement of a state criminal statute
unless there is no other means of avoiding grave and irreparable harm or where a prosecution would be instituted in bad
faith, i.e., with knowledge that there was no reasonable
ex3
pectation that a valid conviction could be obtained.
27. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1342 (1970).
28. See Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299 (1952), for an illustration of the sort of inquiry a federal court must undertake under 28 U.S.C. § 1341 before
it reaches the merits.
29. FRIENDLY at 96.
30. See note 13 supra.
31. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
32. FRIENDLY at 96-97.
33. Id. at 97-98.
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Again, Judge Friendly would go further toward cutting off
federal jurisdiction than the Supreme Court has deemed necessary. Moreover, his position fails to address Justice Brennan's
persuasive opinion, for three members of the Court, in Perez v.
Ladesma,3 a case decided with Younger. In that opinion Justice
Brennan points out the importance of permitting federal courts
to enter declaratory relief with respect to state criminal statutes
when no prosecution is pending in a state court and when a person
or group potentially subject to an allegedly overbroad statute
seeks a determination that the statute cannot constitutionally be
applied to their proposed conduct.35 In such a situation the only
available forum may be the federal court.
In short, Judge Friendly's proposal to use the doctrines of
abstention, exhaustion and comity to lessen federal-state-tensions goes further toward foreclosing federal jurisdiction than the
Supreme Court has thought to be appropriate. His proposal does
so at the expense of those who would legitimately use federal
courts for the vindication of federal rights.
CLASS ACTIONS

Judge Friendly lends his voice to the concerted attack on
class actions under Federal Rule 23(b)(3) that has been mounted
in recent years by Professor Handler and the American College
of Trial Lawyers.36 Both Judge Friendly and these commentators
make the mistake of throwing the baby out with the bath.
The argument is that consumer- or investor-oriented class
actions aren't worth the trouble:
The benefit to any individual plaintiff often is minimal, considerably less than the cost of ascertaining his identity, establishing his damages, and preparing and mailing a check
for the few dollars to which he is entitled. 7
As an example he cites a case in which the class numbered
6,000,000 and individual recoveries were as low as $1.30. Apart
34. 401 U.S. 82, 93 (1971).
35. See 401 U.S. at 104. "Where a criminal statute prohibits or seems to prohibit
constitutionally protected conduct, . . .the opportunity to raise constitutional defenses
at a criminal trial is inadequate to protect the underlying constitutional rights .
Id.
at 118-19.
36. FRIENDLY at 118-20, citing Handler, Twenty-FourthAnnual Antitrust Review, 72
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 36-41 (1972); AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE SPECIAL COMMIrrEE ON RULE 23 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE (1972).
37. FRIENDLY at 119.
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from the objections that may be raised to his using an atypical
case to condemn a wide spectrum of cases, this argument largely
ignores the fact that private class actions are often the only effective way of enforcing the federal antitrust and securities laws.
3
Many cases have recognized this fact. 1
Judge Friendly's opposition to such class actions is premised
on two more specific objections: The "possible consequences of a
judgment to the defendant are so horrendous that these actions
are almost always settled"; and the cases yield "compensation to
the plaintiffs' lawyers which seems inordinate even in these days
of high legal fees. '3 1 But these objections, to the extent they are
valid at all, call for specific solutions. If the fear is that a defendant who has done no wrong will be forced to settle by the danger
of an erroneous but enormous judgment, perhaps the solution is
to defer class action determinations until after the merits are
resolved or until key issues are determined in pretrial proceedings. It is my impression that some judges are already applying
such an approach without articulating it. If the fear is excessive
attorneys' fees, the solution is to set fees that are reasonable in
view of the results achieved and that give proper weight to the
need to encourage skilled lawyers to undertake complex litigation
on a contingent fee basis, which undertaking would further the
effectuation of important public policies that may often be vindicated only in class actions.
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION

Since at least 1928 Judge Friendly has favored a reexamination of federal diversity jurisdiction. In the present book he vigorously argues the case for its abolition." He sees elimination of
diversity jurisdiction as easing the load of the federal courts and
freeing federal judges from the burdens of identifying and applying state law,4 and he believes little benefit is derived from diversity jurisdiction as a means of protecting out-of-state parties from
38. E.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 295, 301 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 977 (1969); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 101 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 928 (1969); Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 329 F.2d 909, 913 (9th Cir.
1964).
39. FRIENDLY at 119-20.
40. Id. at 139-52. Judge Friendly's attack on diversity jurisdiction is limited by the
fact that he favors retention of such jurisdiction in two instances: "suits between a citizen
and foreign states [Countries] or citizens or subjects thereof," id. at 149-50; and suits
under the Interpleader Act, id. at 149-50.
41. Id. at 141-43.
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prejudicial treatment in state courts.2
The arguments are sound, but not persuasive. If federal
courts cannot safely expand or carry their caseloads, then diversity jurisdiction should be abolished (or restricted, by an increase
in the jurisdictional amount requirement or by an elimination of
automobile accident cases as Judge Friendly suggests) before federal question jurisdiction is hindered. However, we have not yet
reached that point.
In the meantime, federal diversity jurisdiction permits the
federal courts to play an important role, in my experience, as
forums for disposition of substantial and complex business matters that are likely to be given little attention in a state court
-especially if the state court is swamped with personal injury
motor vehicle litigation.
Writing as a young lawyer over forty-five years ago, Judge
Friendly himself noted a similar justification underlying the
Founding Fathers' adoption of diversity jurisdiction:
Not unnaturally the commercial interests of the country
were reluctant to expose themselves to the hazards of litigation before such [state] courts. .

.

. They might be good

enough for the inhabitants of their respective states, but
merchants from abroad felt themselves entitled to something
better. There was a vague feeling that the new courts would
be strong courts, creditors' courts, business men's courts."
While it is not clear that federal courts have ever been "creditors' courts" (certainly not in modern times) and while inhabitants of our states unquestionably should have courts as good as
the federal courts, the fact remains that for a variety of reasons
(of which the burden of auto accident litigation and politicallymotivated judicial selection are major factors), state courts are
not often as good as they should be. Until that problem is rectified
and as long as diversity jurisdiction does not impair the function
of district courts in federal question cases, diversity jurisdiction
should be maintained.
Judge Friendly's argument that federal courts should be
freed of the burden of finding and applying state law seems somewhat overemphasized. First, while in certain cases this may be
very burdensome, in most cases (in my experience as an attorney)
it has not been. Whatever difficulty does arise is in large part
42.
43.
(1928).

Id. at 146-49.
Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction,41

1-ARV. L. REV. 483, 498
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more than balanced by the greater attention given to finding and
applying the state law in diversity actions than that generally
provided in state courts. By one analysis, although the burden of
finding and applying state law weighs upon the federal court
system, this burden does not justify depriving litigants of this
greater attention. By another analysis, a litigant faced with a
crowded docket caused by this burden is still better off having the
federal court find and apply the state law. Moreover, in view of
the Supreme Court's encouragement for litigating pendent state
claims in federal question cases, the federal courts will inevitably
be involved in state law matters anyway. 44
CONCLUSION

Judge Friendly's book is likely to be the subject of a good deal
of comment, both critical and otherwise, since it proposes major
changes in the present jurisdiction of the federal courts. Some of
these suggestions not only offend the status quo-which in many
instances deserves to be offended-but, more deeply, reflect a
view of the role of the federal court in our federal system that is
less generous of federal jurisdiction than that of the Supreme
Court or of many commentators. Nevertheless, the issues deserve
much more attention and debate in the legal profession than they
have received. We are indebted to Judge Friendly for a major
contribution to that debate.
Michael L. Shahman*
44. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). I have elsewhere raised
objection to the fact that in Gibbs the Court, by an unnecessary construction of the scope
of the "case" over which federal question jurisdiction extends, effectively discouraged
litigation of federal claims in state courts when there is concurrent jurisdiction. Shakman,
The New Pendent Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REV. 262 (1968).
* Partner, Devoe, Shadur & Krupp, Attorneys at Law, Chicago, Illinois; A.B. 1962,
A.M. 1964, J.D. 1966, University of Chicago.

The Politics of Federal Judicial Administration. By Peter
Graham Fish. Princeton University Press; 1973. Pp. 528. $20.00
(hardbound). $9.75 (paperback).
Mr. Fish, a political science professor at Duke, has written a
carefully documented in depth study of the various agencies
which have been developed over the years to administer the
United States Courts. Basically, these are the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, the Federal Judicial Center, and the Circuit Councils and Conferences. Supported by a wealth of reference to
original sources, Mr. Fish tells us everything we could want to
know about these organizations.
Sometimes what a book does not cover nor purport to cover
is as significant as what it does. As the scheme of the book makes
clear, the work's subject matter quite properly does not deal with
the substantive work of the courts. Nor does the book deal at any
length with that strange excrescence from the judicial process,
the delegation to the courts of the legislative function of rule
making, such as the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. Moreover, the book unfortunately does not purport to cover the contributions to court administration made by Congress. It touches too
briefly the long careful labors of the Congressional Subcommittees on Judicial Administration. Surely the influence of Hatton
Sumners, Emanuel Celler, and Joseph Tydings are as significant
as the largely negative contributions of Congressman John Rooney of the House Appropriations Subcommittee. Somehow, the
latter's control over the courts' budgets must have seemed more
significant to Mr. Fish than the constructive contributions of the
legislators mentioned above. Another area not covered by the
book is the criminal practice field including such reforms as the
Criminal Justice Act and the Bail Reform Act. Nor is even a
passing reference made to the ongoing work of the Commission
on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System. Perhaps such
statutes deal more with the management of litigation than the
management of court calendars, but it is hard to believe that
anybody interested in the operations of the federal courts would
not be concerned with such reforms.
Perhaps I am suggesting another book, but the material in
this book is useful to one working in court administration as a
specialist. As a personal preference, I believe the book would have
been improved by the deletion of two or three hundred pages
detailing not only the correspondence of Chief Justices Taft and
Hughes, but also the hundreds of references to half-disclosed Ju-
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dicial Conference debates. Enthusiasts of this information, however, are well served by Mr. Fish's prodigious efforts in this field
of his study.
The heart of this book pulses with the confrontdti-ns between individual judges and those, including other judges, who
would lead them toward paths of efficient judicial administration. Historically, from the adoption of the Judiciary Act in 1789
to the third decade of the 20th century the federal trial courts
operated independently, each court completely controlling its
calendar, personnel, and procedures. Protected by life tenure,
judges were not only independent in their judging but also in their
administration. Such influence on the district courts as occurred
came from the circuit-riding justices who certainly accepted their
responsibility with less than complete enthusiasm. The courts
were dependent for funds upon the Congress, but even here the
judges' own salaries were constitutionally immune from reduction, and their housekeeping expenses were spoken for by the
Department of Justice rather than by a judicial supervisor. It
took decades even to work out a satisfactory procedure for the
assignment of visiting judges to districts whose dockets were falling behind, partly because both the courts and the bar did not
relish outsiders coming in to pass on their local problems.
Meanwhile, the number and complexity of federal law problems increased. The number of district courts grew from the original thirteen to eighty-nine and the number of judges to about
three hundred fifty. Some unified court administration became
essential.
As a response to the inefficiency in judicial administration
developing from the proliferation of an increasing body of independent district judges, the Judicial Conference, originally
known as the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, was established by law in 1922. Until 1957 only the Senior Judge, now
called the Chief Judge, of each circuit sat in the Conference
with the Chief Justice of the United States presiding. Today,
one district judge from each circuit and a representative from
each of the special courts has been added. In impact and purpose,
the Conference has grown from a judicial bull session to a well
organized instrumentality acting not only as a spokesman for the
judiciary before Congress on legislation and appropriation, but
also as the body which actually supervises the preparation of
Federal Rules, both directly and through committees. It also acts
as a two-way conduit for the exchange of information between
the different levels of the judiciary.

19731

JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

To supplement the Conference, the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts was established in 1939 as a response
to the Conference's lack of staff and underdeveloped system of
committees. If the Conference can be considered as a board of
directors for the courts, the Administrative Office can be considered as the executive arm of that board of directors. However, the
Administrative Office, Mr. Fish suggests, has not lived up to its
potential, partly because of the conservative approach of its
directors and staff, and partly because judges, with the independence of life tenure, are not easily subject to direction.
In any event, these deficiencies were in part ameliorated by
the establishment in 1967 of the Federal Judicial Center. The
Center performs functions of research, training and development
for the judicial branch of the government. The Center has been
headed by federal judges, first by retired Justice Tom Clark and
then Court of Appeals Judge Alfred Murrah, neither of whom
could have suffered from timidity in dealing with other judges.
The Center is directed by a board composed of both appellate
and trial judges. Unfortunately, Mr. Fish gives little space to the
work of the Center and does not speculate on its future role in the
administration of the federal courts.
At the circuit level, administration, such as it is, is performed by the Circuit Councils composed of the judges of the
courts of appeals. Communication back and forth between the
Council and the trial judges has been encouraged by the establishment of Circuit Conferences, which generally meet at a vacation site where the judges talk over common problems and listen
to advice from such national figures as the Circuit Justices and
representatives of the Administrative Office. Mr. Fish suggests
that the circuit agencies have not been particularly successful.
Although some good things, such as the Criminal Justice Act,
found their origin in circuit meetings, their spotty record can be
traced to the fact that the Circuit Councils and Conferences have
been hindered by the lack of staff.
Mr. Fish barely mentions a new actor in the administrative
field, the Court Executive. This new creation, largely the product
of the initiative of Chief Justice Burger, may develop to be on the
circuit level the equivalent of the Administrative Office on the
national level. Many court executives are being trained in the
Institute for Court Management in Denver.
What I have sketched above, Mr. Fish explores in the greatest detail utilizing not only the annual reports of the Administrative Office and the minutes of the Judicial Conference, but also
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extensive correspondence files and personal interviews with such
knowledgeable sources as Judges Biggs and Murrah and with past
and present personnel of the Administrative Office. The result is
a play-by-play account of hundreds of individual administrative
conflicts. Many of these confrontations lack any real impact because the reader lacks background information on the issues involved. For example, the narration of the recent dispute between
Judge Steven Chandler and the Circuit Council of the Tenth
Circuit fails to give enough factual information to enable a reader
to get anything but a glimpse of the real significance of what was
actually involved.'
There are interesting insights, mostly incidentally noted, on
the personalities and methods of the men involved. The reader
picks up a feeling about Chief Justices Taft, Hughes, and Vinson,
Chief Justices Stone and Warren get less notice and Chief Justice
Burger, who is a great activist in this field, is too recent an addition to receive much attention.
The inherent problem in federal court administration is to
reconcile the independence of federal judges with administrative
control by any federal body. If one has listened to trial judges
conversing at lunchtime, it soon becomes clear that their chief
antagonist is not the criminal in the street but the Administrative
Office. While the judgments of trial courts are subject to direct
review, their administration of the courts' business is not. It is a
difficult problem to keep a tight rein on men whose appointment,
compensation, promotion, and tenure are not within the power of
the administrators. The man who appoints and can fire a subordinate, whether he be a judge or a special prosecutor, has the means
of controlling his performance if he desires to do so. Judges are
supposed to be independent and in their very independence lies
the problem.
John F. Davis*
I. The Judicial Council, not approving of Judge Chandler's attitude and conduct
as it affected the business of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma, ordered that all cases pending before Judge Chandler be reassigned to other
judges of that District Court; Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the
United States, 398 U.S. 74 (1970) (motion for leave to file a petition for mandamus to the
Judicial Council denied).
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Maryland. A.B., 1928, Bates College;
LL.B., 1932, Harvard University.

